Defective Modernity and Social Resistance in Contemporary Iran

This study, centered on the concept of mass disobedience in contemporary Iran, examines the relationship between the state, society, and the unfinished process of modernization. The main question is why, despite experiences of revolution, reform, and development efforts, the gap between state and nation has persisted, continually reproducing protests and social resistance. The hypothesis is that with the introduction of modern Western concepts and institutions into Iran, a spirit of political demand emerged; yet, because modernization in Iran was partial and flawed, this demand largely manifested as a sense of deprivation, producing forms of mass disobedience against government policies—both actively (protest movements) and passively (refusal to comply with development policies). To explain this hypothesis, the research employs a hybrid theoretical framework, drawing on theories of ‘modernization and revolution’ and the psychology of mass action. This framework is further reinforced by relevant theories appropriate to the historical period. Findings show that under the Pahlavi regime, despite infrastructural achievements, modernization was authoritarian and top-down, producing a widening gap between modern structures and traditional mentalities, resulting in a superficial modernity dependent on state power. This fracture fueled popular discontent and culminated in the 1979 revolution. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development.
This study, centered on the concept of mass disobedience in contemporary Iran, examines the relationship between the state, society, and the unfinished process of modernization. The main question is why, despite experiences of revolution, reform, and development efforts, the gap between state and nation has persisted, continually reproducing protests and social resistance. The hypothesis is that with the introduction of modern Western concepts and institutions into Iran, a spirit of political demand emerged; yet, because modernization in Iran was partial and flawed, this demand largely manifested as a sense of deprivation, producing forms of mass disobedience against government policies—both actively (protest movements) and passively (refusal to comply with development policies). To explain this hypothesis, the research employs a hybrid theoretical framework, drawing on theories of ‘modernization and revolution’ and the psychology of mass action. This framework is further reinforced by relevant theories appropriate to the historical period. Findings show that under the Pahlavi regime, despite infrastructural achievements, modernization was authoritarian and top-down, producing a widening gap between modern structures and traditional mentalities, resulting in a superficial modernity dependent on state power. This fracture fueled popular discontent and culminated in the 1979 revolution. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development. Under the Islamic Republic, despite initial mass mobilization and redistributive policies, development became a rentier, selective, and controlled process, thereby weakening independent institutions and civil society. Thus, the study concludes that Iran’s main problem is not the absence of modernity, but a “defective modernity”—authoritarian in nature, inherently generating disobedience and undermining the possibility of sustainable and democratic development.