Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Disciplinary Governance and the Regulation of the Female Body: An Analysis of Power Discourse and State-Building in the Conduct of the Second Caliph Disciplinary Governance and the Regulation of the Female Body: An Analysis of Power Discourse and State-Building in the Conduct of the Second Caliph 28319 10.48311/jhs.2026.118927.82931 FA Zahra Abaspuor PhD Student in Population and Family Governance, Faculty of Governance, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0003-1942-5172 Mohsen Badreh PhD in Women’s Studies, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-5309-6999 Journal Article 2026 01 24 This qualitative historical sociology study employs a Foucauldian genealogical approach to power to explore the discursive and disciplinary mechanisms of governance over the feminine body during the caliphate of Umar ibn al-Khattab (13–23 AH/634–644 CE). Umar’s era marks a pivotal transition in early Islamic state-building, characterized by expansive conquests from Hijaz to the Levant, Iraq, and Persia, necessitating social cohesion through gendered regulation. The central issue is the discursive shift in women’s status: from the participatory Prophetic model—evident in women’s military roles at Uhud (Ibn Hisham, Sira, vol. 2, p. 67), Aisha’s objection to dowry limits (Sahih Bukhari, Book of Marriage, Hadith 5135), and Fatima al-Zahra’s public activities in the mosque (Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat, vol. 8, p. 12)—to Umar’s disciplinary regime, which reduced the feminine body to a docile, subordinate object. The hypothesis posits a structural rupture from Quranic spousal equity (e.g., 4:19; 2:228) toward a governmentality apparatus blending pre-Islamic Bedouin asabiyya with religious legitimacy, rendering patriarchal dominance a strategic imperative for imperial consolidation. In the literature, domestic studies like Allahi-Nazari (1384/2005) attribute women’s social decline to conquests and foreign cultural influx, overlooking the caliph’s political agency. Memari and Khalighi (1395/2016) critique hadith narrations prohibiting women’s literacy on evidential grounds but neglect their socio-political production. International works, such as Mernissi (1991) and Ahmed (1992), identify Umar’s era as patriarchal revival, while Halevi (2004) highlights body control in mourning, though often ideological and lacking institutionalized power mechanisms. The theoretical framework draws on Foucault’s disciplinary power (Discipline and Punish, 1975), governmentality and biopolitics (Society Must Be Defended, 2007; History of Sexuality, 1978)—rendering bodies docile utilities—; Asad’s Islamic power genealogy (Formations of the Secular, 2003); Butler’s gender performativity (Gender Trouble, 1990); and Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya (Muqaddimah, 1377/1958). The methodology adopts reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006/2021) to uncover latent semantic patterns and discursive structures in historical data. The six-phase process includes familiarization and initial notes; inductive initial coding (semantic labeling); theme searching and collating; review and refinement via concept maps; final definition and naming; and analytical reporting. Data comprise 38 gendered narrations from primary Sunni sources (al-Tabari, Tarikh; Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat; Sahih Bukhari/Muslim; Sunan Abi Dawud/Tirmidhi/Nasa’i/Bayhaqi). Purposive selection prioritized direct attribution to Umar, strong chains (mutawatir/mashhur), and coverage of private/public domains. The core corpus refined to 26 narrations post-duplicate/irrelevant removal; 142 codes (e.g., “plaything,” “confine women”) yielded 12 sub-themes and 3 superordinate themes. Analysis proceeded to theoretical saturation, where new data produced no novel codes/themes. Strategic focus on first-hand Sunni historiography ensures methodological rigor: (1) comprehensive administrative details for governance analysis; (2) bias mitigation via adab al-iltizam rule, elevating findings from sectarian polemic to intra-textual academic critique. Reflexivity on researcher biases; credibility via triangulation, juristic corroboration (e.g., Shafi’i), and exclusion of Shi’i sources for Sunni neutrality. Findings delineate Umar’s governance as a systematic gendered policy across three interconnected themes. Theme 1: Ontological Subordination of Women (Woman as Deficient Gender). Umar’s worldview ontologically subordinates women, transitioning from Quranic equity to social order logic. Narrations depict women as “fitna” (al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 456) or “plaything” (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 123), with directives like “consult women but do not follow their opinion” (Abi Dawud, 2140). Epistemic erasure via literacy bans (“do not teach women beyond need lest fitna increase”; Ibn Qutayba, Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 4, p. 78) and mandatory veiling. Familial roles prioritize biotic reproduction, as in Umar’s view of marriage as lineage continuity sans lust (al-Manawi, Fayd al-Qadir, vol. 1, p. 84). This constructs woman as dangerous “Other,” legitimizing subsequent controls. Theme 2: Disciplinary and Regulatory Policies (Punitive Governance). Umar’s approach embeds authoritarian discipline in private, familial, and public spheres, transforming violence into managerial technique. Privately, forced marriages (e.g., Atika bint Zayd; Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 208) and normalized domestic violence (“do not investigate men’s striking wives”; al-Nasa’i, 4942) grant judicial impunity. Narrations of slapping Jamila (al-Suyuti, vol. 5, p. 194) and spousal apostasy highlight psychic insecurity. Familial rearing adopts barracks model: biting family in anger (al-Zubayr ibn Bakkar, p. 602); executing son of Abd al-Rahman unto death (Mus’ab ibn Abd Allah, p. 356); forcing son of Abd Allah to divorce (Ibn Majah, vol. 1, p. 675). Publicly, militarized “confine women” (Tirmidhi, 1160) imposes stratified veiling (Bayhaqi, vol. 7, p. 92), flogging wailing women (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 5, p. 345), and bans on women narrating/transmitting. These hybridize tribal-Islamic norms, turning homes into panopticons. Theme 3: Reproduction of Tribal Norms. Policies fuse asabiyya with religious legitimacy, militarizing public spaces and marginalizing epistemic ones. Veiling as class marker prohibits it for slave-women, objectifying non-docile bodies (al-Suyuti, vol. 5, p. 221; al-Sarakhsi, vol. 10, p. 151). Bans on mourning and public flogging (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 30) suppress feminine expressions. Hadith narration prohibitions (“women stay indoors”; Abi Dawud, vol. 1, p. 137; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, vol. 6, pp. 297–301) and “woman is awra; when she exits, Satan adorns her” (Ibn Abi Shayba, vol. 2, p. 277) enforce isolation. Hadith codification bans and Quranic exegesis prohibitions (al-Tabari, vol. 12, p. 93) invite Israelite influences (al-Dhahabi, vol. 2, p. 447) and embed misogynist stereotypes (e.g., “woman is quarrelsome”; al-Shafi’i, vol. 2, p. 523), marginalizing women’s epistemic role. Counter-evidence like women’s dowry challenges to Umar (al-Sana’ani, vol. 6, p. 180; al-Qurtubi, vol. 5, p. 99) shows resistance. Discussion unveils a Foucauldian disciplinary regime: from Prophetic inclusion to isolation, aligning with conquest imperatives. Compared to Abu Bakr, Umar’s policies prefigure Ottoman/Abbasid expansion, reconstructing asabiyya for umma norms. This qualitative historical sociology study employs a Foucauldian genealogical approach to power to explore the discursive and disciplinary mechanisms of governance over the feminine body during the caliphate of Umar ibn al-Khattab (13–23 AH/634–644 CE). Umar’s era marks a pivotal transition in early Islamic state-building, characterized by expansive conquests from Hijaz to the Levant, Iraq, and Persia, necessitating social cohesion through gendered regulation. The central issue is the discursive shift in women’s status: from the participatory Prophetic model—evident in women’s military roles at Uhud (Ibn Hisham, Sira, vol. 2, p. 67), Aisha’s objection to dowry limits (Sahih Bukhari, Book of Marriage, Hadith 5135), and Fatima al-Zahra’s public activities in the mosque (Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat, vol. 8, p. 12)—to Umar’s disciplinary regime, which reduced the feminine body to a docile, subordinate object. The hypothesis posits a structural rupture from Quranic spousal equity (e.g., 4:19; 2:228) toward a governmentality apparatus blending pre-Islamic Bedouin asabiyya with religious legitimacy, rendering patriarchal dominance a strategic imperative for imperial consolidation. In the literature, domestic studies like Allahi-Nazari (1384/2005) attribute women’s social decline to conquests and foreign cultural influx, overlooking the caliph’s political agency. Memari and Khalighi (1395/2016) critique hadith narrations prohibiting women’s literacy on evidential grounds but neglect their socio-political production. International works, such as Mernissi (1991) and Ahmed (1992), identify Umar’s era as patriarchal revival, while Halevi (2004) highlights body control in mourning, though often ideological and lacking institutionalized power mechanisms. The theoretical framework draws on Foucault’s disciplinary power (Discipline and Punish, 1975), governmentality and biopolitics (Society Must Be Defended, 2007; History of Sexuality, 1978)—rendering bodies docile utilities—; Asad’s Islamic power genealogy (Formations of the Secular, 2003); Butler’s gender performativity (Gender Trouble, 1990); and Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyya (Muqaddimah, 1377/1958). The methodology adopts reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006/2021) to uncover latent semantic patterns and discursive structures in historical data. The six-phase process includes familiarization and initial notes; inductive initial coding (semantic labeling); theme searching and collating; review and refinement via concept maps; final definition and naming; and analytical reporting. Data comprise 38 gendered narrations from primary Sunni sources (al-Tabari, Tarikh; Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqat; Sahih Bukhari/Muslim; Sunan Abi Dawud/Tirmidhi/Nasa’i/Bayhaqi). Purposive selection prioritized direct attribution to Umar, strong chains (mutawatir/mashhur), and coverage of private/public domains. The core corpus refined to 26 narrations post-duplicate/irrelevant removal; 142 codes (e.g., “plaything,” “confine women”) yielded 12 sub-themes and 3 superordinate themes. Analysis proceeded to theoretical saturation, where new data produced no novel codes/themes. Strategic focus on first-hand Sunni historiography ensures methodological rigor: (1) comprehensive administrative details for governance analysis; (2) bias mitigation via adab al-iltizam rule, elevating findings from sectarian polemic to intra-textual academic critique. Reflexivity on researcher biases; credibility via triangulation, juristic corroboration (e.g., Shafi’i), and exclusion of Shi’i sources for Sunni neutrality. Findings delineate Umar’s governance as a systematic gendered policy across three interconnected themes. Theme 1: Ontological Subordination of Women (Woman as Deficient Gender). Umar’s worldview ontologically subordinates women, transitioning from Quranic equity to social order logic. Narrations depict women as “fitna” (al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 456) or “plaything” (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 123), with directives like “consult women but do not follow their opinion” (Abi Dawud, 2140). Epistemic erasure via literacy bans (“do not teach women beyond need lest fitna increase”; Ibn Qutayba, Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 4, p. 78) and mandatory veiling. Familial roles prioritize biotic reproduction, as in Umar’s view of marriage as lineage continuity sans lust (al-Manawi, Fayd al-Qadir, vol. 1, p. 84). This constructs woman as dangerous “Other,” legitimizing subsequent controls. Theme 2: Disciplinary and Regulatory Policies (Punitive Governance). Umar’s approach embeds authoritarian discipline in private, familial, and public spheres, transforming violence into managerial technique. Privately, forced marriages (e.g., Atika bint Zayd; Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 208) and normalized domestic violence (“do not investigate men’s striking wives”; al-Nasa’i, 4942) grant judicial impunity. Narrations of slapping Jamila (al-Suyuti, vol. 5, p. 194) and spousal apostasy highlight psychic insecurity. Familial rearing adopts barracks model: biting family in anger (al-Zubayr ibn Bakkar, p. 602); executing son of Abd al-Rahman unto death (Mus’ab ibn Abd Allah, p. 356); forcing son of Abd Allah to divorce (Ibn Majah, vol. 1, p. 675). Publicly, militarized “confine women” (Tirmidhi, 1160) imposes stratified veiling (Bayhaqi, vol. 7, p. 92), flogging wailing women (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 5, p. 345), and bans on women narrating/transmitting. These hybridize tribal-Islamic norms, turning homes into panopticons. Theme 3: Reproduction of Tribal Norms. Policies fuse asabiyya with religious legitimacy, militarizing public spaces and marginalizing epistemic ones. Veiling as class marker prohibits it for slave-women, objectifying non-docile bodies (al-Suyuti, vol. 5, p. 221; al-Sarakhsi, vol. 10, p. 151). Bans on mourning and public flogging (Ibn Sa’d, vol. 8, p. 30) suppress feminine expressions. Hadith narration prohibitions (“women stay indoors”; Abi Dawud, vol. 1, p. 137; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, vol. 6, pp. 297–301) and “woman is awra; when she exits, Satan adorns her” (Ibn Abi Shayba, vol. 2, p. 277) enforce isolation. Hadith codification bans and Quranic exegesis prohibitions (al-Tabari, vol. 12, p. 93) invite Israelite influences (al-Dhahabi, vol. 2, p. 447) and embed misogynist stereotypes (e.g., “woman is quarrelsome”; al-Shafi’i, vol. 2, p. 523), marginalizing women’s epistemic role. Counter-evidence like women’s dowry challenges to Umar (al-Sana’ani, vol. 6, p. 180; al-Qurtubi, vol. 5, p. 99) shows resistance. Discussion unveils a Foucauldian disciplinary regime: from Prophetic inclusion to isolation, aligning with conquest imperatives. Compared to Abu Bakr, Umar’s policies prefigure Ottoman/Abbasid expansion, reconstructing asabiyya for umma norms.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28319_4fca121af959c80dbc701b7aacb7156e.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Sufism and the Reconstruction of Social Solidarity in the Seljuk Era: A Functionalist Analysis Based on Emile Durkheim's Theory of Religion Sufism and the Reconstruction of Social Solidarity in the Seljuk Era: A Functionalist Analysis Based on Emile Durkheim's Theory of Religion 28320 10.48311/jhs.2026.119184.82934 FA Lida Mavadat Jafar Dehghani PhD student in history, Shiraz University Journal Article 2026 02 08 The Seljuk period represents one of the most conflict-laden eras in the social history of Islam, characterized by intense jurisprudential and theological rivalries among various groups, including Hanafis, Shafiʿis, Ashʿaris, Muʿtazilites, Imamites, and Ismailis. These rivalries were not limited to intellectual debate or doctrinal disagreement; they permeated social relations, religious institutions, political authority structures, and the daily lives of ordinary people. Widespread socio-religious tensions emerged across many cities and regions, occasionally escalating into episodes of sectarian violence. The proliferation of urban centers, the dispersion of diverse sects, and the intensification of local competition further exacerbated these conflicts, challenging traditional forms of social cohesion and destabilizing communities across the Islamic world. The complexity of these dynamics necessitated mechanisms capable of sustaining collective integration and reinforcing social order amidst profound structural and cultural transformations. This study examines the role of Sufism in responding to these tensions through the lens of Émile Durkheim’s theory of the social function of religion. According to Durkheim, religion is not merely a set of beliefs or ritual practices, but a social institution that generates shared meaning, strengthens collective solidarity, and contributes to the reconstruction and maintenance of moral and social order. Using this framework, the study investigates how Sufism acted as a social mechanism capable of mitigating, regulating, or redefining religious conflicts and social tensions during the Seljuk period. It emphasizes that Sufism should not be viewed as a marginal, ascetic, or purely mystical phenomenon; rather, it was deeply intertwined with broader structural and social transformations and played a vital role in rebuilding social cohesion. The findings indicate that Sufi discourse shifted the focus of religiosity from rigid jurisprudential and sectarian identities to inward spiritual experience, ethical cultivation, self-purification, and a deeply personal and emotional relationship with the sacred. This symbolic reorientation softened rigid religious boundaries and allowed religiosity to emphasize moral and spiritual development rather than identity-based distinctions. Consequently, Sufism facilitated coexistence among adherents of diverse doctrinal orientations, helping to reduce potential conflicts and social fragmentation, while providing a framework for negotiating differences in belief and practice in a complex, multi-sectarian society. At the institutional level, khānqāhs, networks of masters and disciples, and collective rituals such as dhikr and samaʿ played a crucial role in shaping what Durkheim termed the “collective conscience.” These spaces were not merely arenas for individual spiritual practice; they fostered shared experiences of the sacred that promoted empathy, emotional cohesion, and group solidarity. By creating a common symbolic and ritual language, Sufi institutions enabled participants from different sectarian backgrounds to engage in collective worship and communal spiritual practice, thereby integrating fragmented communities and reinforcing social bonds across sectarian lines. The communal and ritual dimensions of Sufism extended its influence beyond individual spirituality and allowed it to function as a social mechanism that mediated tensions, stabilized relationships, and cultivated a shared moral order. Moreover, Sufism served as a mediating force in regulating social tensions. In a context where political authorities and jurisprudential institutions were embroiled in legitimacy disputes and theological controversies, Sufism offered a form of cross-group cultural solidarity that transcended strict sectarian boundaries. It provided an emotional and symbolic arena in which religious identity could be redefined, contributing to the alleviation of social fractures. The engagement of scholars and intellectual elites with Sufism further illustrates its capacity to address both social and existential crises, offering a symbolic, ritual, and experience-based framework to reconcile the gap between formal religion, doctrinal debate, and societal needs. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of Sufism through organized ṭarīqas sometimes generated new collective identities, highlighting the ambivalent nature of religious institutions. While Sufism strengthened social cohesion, the formalization of its structures occasionally reproduced identity distinctions, illustrating the dual function of this movement. However, through ritual, shared symbolic practice, and collective sacred experience, Sufism remained an integral mechanism alongside political and jurisprudential structures, contributing significantly to the maintenance and stabilization of social order during a period marked by intense tension and conflict. In conclusion, applying a Durkheimian framework demonstrates that Sufism in the Seljuk period was far more than a theological or individualistic phenomenon. It operated as a vital social mechanism that reconstructed collective solidarity, mediated societal tensions, and linked sacred experience with communal and institutional structures. In this light, Sufism emerges as a dual-force phenomenon, simultaneously reinforcing social cohesion and redefining religious boundaries, thereby shaping the spiritual and social landscape of the Seljuk era in enduring and transformative ways. The Seljuk period represents one of the most conflict-laden eras in the social history of Islam, characterized by intense jurisprudential and theological rivalries among various groups, including Hanafis, Shafiʿis, Ashʿaris, Muʿtazilites, Imamites, and Ismailis. These rivalries were not limited to intellectual debate or doctrinal disagreement; they permeated social relations, religious institutions, political authority structures, and the daily lives of ordinary people. Widespread socio-religious tensions emerged across many cities and regions, occasionally escalating into episodes of sectarian violence. The proliferation of urban centers, the dispersion of diverse sects, and the intensification of local competition further exacerbated these conflicts, challenging traditional forms of social cohesion and destabilizing communities across the Islamic world. The complexity of these dynamics necessitated mechanisms capable of sustaining collective integration and reinforcing social order amidst profound structural and cultural transformations. This study examines the role of Sufism in responding to these tensions through the lens of Émile Durkheim’s theory of the social function of religion. According to Durkheim, religion is not merely a set of beliefs or ritual practices, but a social institution that generates shared meaning, strengthens collective solidarity, and contributes to the reconstruction and maintenance of moral and social order. Using this framework, the study investigates how Sufism acted as a social mechanism capable of mitigating, regulating, or redefining religious conflicts and social tensions during the Seljuk period. It emphasizes that Sufism should not be viewed as a marginal, ascetic, or purely mystical phenomenon; rather, it was deeply intertwined with broader structural and social transformations and played a vital role in rebuilding social cohesion. The findings indicate that Sufi discourse shifted the focus of religiosity from rigid jurisprudential and sectarian identities to inward spiritual experience, ethical cultivation, self-purification, and a deeply personal and emotional relationship with the sacred. This symbolic reorientation softened rigid religious boundaries and allowed religiosity to emphasize moral and spiritual development rather than identity-based distinctions. Consequently, Sufism facilitated coexistence among adherents of diverse doctrinal orientations, helping to reduce potential conflicts and social fragmentation, while providing a framework for negotiating differences in belief and practice in a complex, multi-sectarian society. At the institutional level, khānqāhs, networks of masters and disciples, and collective rituals such as dhikr and samaʿ played a crucial role in shaping what Durkheim termed the “collective conscience.” These spaces were not merely arenas for individual spiritual practice; they fostered shared experiences of the sacred that promoted empathy, emotional cohesion, and group solidarity. By creating a common symbolic and ritual language, Sufi institutions enabled participants from different sectarian backgrounds to engage in collective worship and communal spiritual practice, thereby integrating fragmented communities and reinforcing social bonds across sectarian lines. The communal and ritual dimensions of Sufism extended its influence beyond individual spirituality and allowed it to function as a social mechanism that mediated tensions, stabilized relationships, and cultivated a shared moral order. Moreover, Sufism served as a mediating force in regulating social tensions. In a context where political authorities and jurisprudential institutions were embroiled in legitimacy disputes and theological controversies, Sufism offered a form of cross-group cultural solidarity that transcended strict sectarian boundaries. It provided an emotional and symbolic arena in which religious identity could be redefined, contributing to the alleviation of social fractures. The engagement of scholars and intellectual elites with Sufism further illustrates its capacity to address both social and existential crises, offering a symbolic, ritual, and experience-based framework to reconcile the gap between formal religion, doctrinal debate, and societal needs. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of Sufism through organized ṭarīqas sometimes generated new collective identities, highlighting the ambivalent nature of religious institutions. While Sufism strengthened social cohesion, the formalization of its structures occasionally reproduced identity distinctions, illustrating the dual function of this movement. However, through ritual, shared symbolic practice, and collective sacred experience, Sufism remained an integral mechanism alongside political and jurisprudential structures, contributing significantly to the maintenance and stabilization of social order during a period marked by intense tension and conflict. In conclusion, applying a Durkheimian framework demonstrates that Sufism in the Seljuk period was far more than a theological or individualistic phenomenon. It operated as a vital social mechanism that reconstructed collective solidarity, mediated societal tensions, and linked sacred experience with communal and institutional structures. In this light, Sufism emerges as a dual-force phenomenon, simultaneously reinforcing social cohesion and redefining religious boundaries, thereby shaping the spiritual and social landscape of the Seljuk era in enduring and transformative ways.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28320_fe2e8c9e03498e3bd2c4c2205afdfc44.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Studying the impact of land reforms on the settlement of the Bakhtiari tribe in Khuzestan (1963 to 1978) Studying the impact of land reforms on the settlement of the Bakhtiari tribe in Khuzestan (1963 to 1978) 28870 10.48311/jhs.2026.117423.82914 FA PEYMAN DAVOODI Beheshti University, Iranology Foundation 0009-0005-1991-8414 Alireza Mollaiy Tavani History Research Institute - Humanities and Cultural Studies Research Institute 0009-0004-1144-0543 Journal Article 2025 11 02 ایل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودند. یل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودنیل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودنیل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی.یل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودن ایل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودند. یل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودنیل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودنیل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی.یل بختیاری، تا پیش از تحولات دورة پهلوی، یکی از ایلات کوچ رو ایران بود که میان استان‌های خوزستان و اصفهان به شیوۀ کوچ‌نشینی روزگار می‌گذراند. پس از تحولات اجتماعی و اقتصادی در دهه‌های چهل و پنجاه خورشیدی، یکجانشینی، بالاخص شهرنشینی در سراسر کشور افزایش یافت. این روند باعث شد تا از جمعیت ایلاتِ کوچ رو در ایران کاسته شود. به طور طبیعی انتظار این بود که ایل بختیاری نیز تحت تاثیر اصلاحات ارضی، به یکجانشینی روی آورد یا روند یکجانشینی آن سرعت بیشتری بگیرد. اما در عمل چنین نشد. بنابراین، سوال اینجاست که اصلاحات ارضی، بر روند یکجانشینی ایل بختیاری در خوزستان چه تأثیری گذاشت و خوانین بختیاری در این میان چه نقشی ایفا کردند؟ مقاله با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و بررسی اسناد و مصاحبه‌ها، به این نتیجه می‌رسد که اصلاحات ارضی در ایل بختیاریِ ساکن در خوزستان، به دلایلی از جمله کوهستانی بودن محل سکونت ایل بختیاری و اولویت نداشتن زمین کشاورزی در معیشت آنان، تأثیر چندانی بر یکجانشین کردن ایل بختیاری در خوزستان، نداشت. خوانین نیز به‌عنوان سردمداران ایل، از اصلاحات ارضی نه‌تنها استقبال نکردند که با آن مخالفت نمودن

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28870_11bf14c1513b62f30e5e8be425774d30.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Meuanalisa Wacana Politik lam Cita-cita Baha'i Dame Donya: Saboh Kajian Kontradiksi Teoritis ngon Praktis Meuanalisa Wacana Politik lam Cita-cita Baha'i Dame Donya: Saboh Kajian Kontradiksi Teoritis ngon Praktis 28871 10.48311/jhs.2026.117426.82916 FA Marzieh Nusrati PhD student in History, Shiite Sect Orientation, Qom University of Religions and Denominations Mustafa Sultani Dosen, Jurusan Agama Islam, Universitas Agama dan Konfesi Qom Hamidreza Bigdali Dosen, Fakultas Ilmu Islam, Universitas Agama dan Konfesi Qom Ali Khalaji Dosen Tamu, Universitas Agama dan Mazhab Qom Journal Article 2025 11 02 Political Discourse Analysis in the Baha'i Ideal of World Peace A Study of Theoretical and Practical Contradictions Abstract Using the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological framework that examines the relationship between language, power, and ideology in society. With the question of this research, how does the critical political discourse of CDA challenge the contradictions of Baha'iism and the claim of world peace? We will examine the political dimensions of the peace discourse in Baha'iism. The main goal of the research is to analyze the fundamental contradictions between the Baha'i peace-seeking slogans in their twelve teachings and also the political performance of this organization.Norman Fairclough believes that language plays a very important role in creating, maintaining, and legitimizing inequality, injustice, and oppression in society. Aiming to explore the structural contradictions and hidden layers of power in the Baha'i discourse, this research examines the relationship between the alleged teachings and socio-political actions of this movement based on Norman Fairclough's three-level model (description, interpretation, and explanation). The research findings show that propositions such as "non-interference in politics" and "general peace", beyond moral concepts, act as discursive tools for managing the mass of followers and concealing the political ideal of "establishing a world government" and have inherent contradictions that have turned the discourse of peace into a tool for legitimization.At the level of interpretation and explanation, the strategic links of this organization with the colonial and arrogant powers (Russia, England and America) and the systematic influence in the governing structures of the Pahlavi era indicate a “purposeful paradox”; in such a way that the political silence of the followers expropriates political agency in favor of the elites connected to the global powers. Also, this research explains that the slogan of “cosmopolitanism” by labeling patriotism as “bias” seeks to erode national and religious identities (especially in Iran) in order to provide a platform for cultural transformation and the establishment of its desired ideological order. Finally, this discourse is analyzed as a modern form of “peace through domination” that employs language to legitimize exploitative power relations.In the field of social thought, language is not simply a tool for transmitting messages; it is also an arena in which power is reproduced and ideologies are “naturalized” under the guise of words. One of the most challenging examples in this regard is the discourse of the Baha’i organization on “world peace” and “non-interference in politics.” By utilizing concepts such as “unity of the human world” and “one homeland,” this movement presents a moral and transnational image of itself that, at first glance, seems to be a response to the pains of contemporary humanity. However, when we dissect these texts and statements using Norman Fairclough’s “critical discourse analysis” (CDA) method, we encounter a deep gap between “text” and “social practice.”The main issue here is how to reconcile the absolute prohibition of intervention in politics for the mass of followers (under expressions such as "even in words") and, on the other hand, the explicit ideal of establishing a "world super-state" with an undisputed executive branch and an international parliament. The article presented on Baha'iism, using the CDA method, which is a type of discourse analysis, helps us: analyze the gap between speech and action in Baha'iism. Identify legitimizing linguistic strategies and reveal hidden power relations in peace discourse. Discover the political ideology behind religious slogans. This research, which is of a theoretical nature and uses a qualitative-analytical method and a library-based method of data collection, was conducted with the approach of Norman Fairclough's political discourse analysis. It aims to go beyond the descriptive level of words and reach the hidden layers of "interpretation" and "explanation".In this analysis, we will examine how the slogan of “cosmopolitanism” becomes a tool for undermining national and religious identities, and how the historical links of these organizations with colonial and arrogant powers, on the one hand, seek to gain international legitimacy, and on the other, represent a modern form of “peace through domination.” Drawing on historical documents and the writings of the leaders of this movement, we will show that the “new order” is not a spiritual utopia, but a political-ideological project that uses language to normalize power relations and eliminate cultural pluralism. Keywords: Bahá’íism, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Norman Fairclough, Global Governance, Non-Intervention in Politics Political Discourse Analysis in the Baha'i Ideal of World Peace A Study of Theoretical and Practical Contradictions Abstract Using the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological framework that examines the relationship between language, power, and ideology in society. With the question of this research, how does the critical political discourse of CDA challenge the contradictions of Baha'iism and the claim of world peace? We will examine the political dimensions of the peace discourse in Baha'iism. The main goal of the research is to analyze the fundamental contradictions between the Baha'i peace-seeking slogans in their twelve teachings and also the political performance of this organization.Norman Fairclough believes that language plays a very important role in creating, maintaining, and legitimizing inequality, injustice, and oppression in society. Aiming to explore the structural contradictions and hidden layers of power in the Baha'i discourse, this research examines the relationship between the alleged teachings and socio-political actions of this movement based on Norman Fairclough's three-level model (description, interpretation, and explanation). The research findings show that propositions such as "non-interference in politics" and "general peace", beyond moral concepts, act as discursive tools for managing the mass of followers and concealing the political ideal of "establishing a world government" and have inherent contradictions that have turned the discourse of peace into a tool for legitimization.At the level of interpretation and explanation, the strategic links of this organization with the colonial and arrogant powers (Russia, England and America) and the systematic influence in the governing structures of the Pahlavi era indicate a “purposeful paradox”; in such a way that the political silence of the followers expropriates political agency in favor of the elites connected to the global powers. Also, this research explains that the slogan of “cosmopolitanism” by labeling patriotism as “bias” seeks to erode national and religious identities (especially in Iran) in order to provide a platform for cultural transformation and the establishment of its desired ideological order. Finally, this discourse is analyzed as a modern form of “peace through domination” that employs language to legitimize exploitative power relations.In the field of social thought, language is not simply a tool for transmitting messages; it is also an arena in which power is reproduced and ideologies are “naturalized” under the guise of words. One of the most challenging examples in this regard is the discourse of the Baha’i organization on “world peace” and “non-interference in politics.” By utilizing concepts such as “unity of the human world” and “one homeland,” this movement presents a moral and transnational image of itself that, at first glance, seems to be a response to the pains of contemporary humanity. However, when we dissect these texts and statements using Norman Fairclough’s “critical discourse analysis” (CDA) method, we encounter a deep gap between “text” and “social practice.”The main issue here is how to reconcile the absolute prohibition of intervention in politics for the mass of followers (under expressions such as "even in words") and, on the other hand, the explicit ideal of establishing a "world super-state" with an undisputed executive branch and an international parliament. The article presented on Baha'iism, using the CDA method, which is a type of discourse analysis, helps us: analyze the gap between speech and action in Baha'iism. Identify legitimizing linguistic strategies and reveal hidden power relations in peace discourse. Discover the political ideology behind religious slogans. This research, which is of a theoretical nature and uses a qualitative-analytical method and a library-based method of data collection, was conducted with the approach of Norman Fairclough's political discourse analysis. It aims to go beyond the descriptive level of words and reach the hidden layers of "interpretation" and "explanation".In this analysis, we will examine how the slogan of “cosmopolitanism” becomes a tool for undermining national and religious identities, and how the historical links of these organizations with colonial and arrogant powers, on the one hand, seek to gain international legitimacy, and on the other, represent a modern form of “peace through domination.” Drawing on historical documents and the writings of the leaders of this movement, we will show that the “new order” is not a spiritual utopia, but a political-ideological project that uses language to normalize power relations and eliminate cultural pluralism. Keywords: Bahá’íism, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Norman Fairclough, Global Governance, Non-Intervention in Politics

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28871_b9630d51806c5bf8ab0cef3fd97d414f.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Title: Teaching History and National Identity: An Analysis of the Logic and Rationale of History Education in Schools and Universities Title: Teaching History and National Identity: An Analysis of the Logic and Rationale of History Education in Schools and Universities 28872 10.48311/jhs.2026.118197.82923 FA Gholamreza Shahbakhsh Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi University. Boroujerd, Iran. tajbakhsh@abru.ac.ir 0000-0002-1155-8857 Negar Gholami pg in sociology 0009-0008-6639-7457 Journal Article 2026 01 05 TAbstract . In the present study, the “logic and why of history education” is examined from a sociological and educational perspective to clarify why and how history education should serve the reconstruction of students’ national and social identity. The main research question is: Has history education in the Iranian educational system been able to play its role in strengthening national identity and developing historical thinking? In order to answer this question, the present study, with a qualitative approach and field method, examines the views of professors and student teachers of history at Farhangian University of Lorestan in order to gain a deeper understanding of the current situation and strategies for improving history education within the framework of the philosophy of education and the sociology of education through their lived experiences. The present study aims to explore the logic and rationale of history education in Iran’s educational system, emphasizing its role in strengthening national and cultural identity. History teaching is not merely the transmission of past events, but a pedagogical tool for fostering critical thinking, historical awareness, and cultural continuity. In recent years, with the expansion of digital media and changing youth values, the need to reconsider the aims and methods of history education has become increasingly urgent. This research employed a qualitative, field-based approach. The study population included 15 history education professors and 30 student-teachers from Farhangian University of Lorestan, selected through purposive sampling. Semi-structured interviews were used for data collection, and thematic analysis was applied for data interpretation. Findings indicate that history education becomes meaningful when linked to learners’ national identity and cultural background. Shifting from memory-based approaches toward analytical and problem-oriented learning fosters deeper engagement and a stronger sense of belonging. Finally, several practical strategies for improving history education in teacher training programs and school curricula are proposed. From a negative perspective, ignoring the why and philosophy of history education reduces this course to a level of memory-based and non-analytical information transfer, which results in learners’ disinterest, reduced motivation to learn, and a disconnect between the course content and real life. If history is viewed simply as a collection of events, historians, and kings, its educational and identity-building function is lost. This can lead to a kind of crisis of meaning in education, in which the younger generation loses its connection to the past and its cultural identity (Haydn, 2012). On a larger scale, neglecting the logic of history education leads to the weakening of cultural capital, the instability of national identity, and even the formation of superficial attitudes towards history (Husbands, Kitson, & Pendry, 2003). On the other hand, in the teacher education system, the lack of theoretical reflection on the goals and whys of history education can have long-term consequences for the quality of education. If student teachers enter the teaching field without understanding the philosophy of history education, they will view historical content not as a tool for fostering critical thinking and citizenship, but simply as a collection of data. This leads to a weakening of the educational role of history in schools (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Therefore, addressing the necessity and logic of teaching history from a scientific and field perspective is not only an educational need but also a cultural and social necessity that can be effective in designing curricula, compiling educational books, and empowering history teachers. In Iran, studies also show that many history teachers are still involved in descriptive education and have moved less towards conceptual and analytical education (Akbari, 2011; Babaei, 2019). This issue doubles the importance of a field study on why history is taught, because without a deep understanding of the philosophy and educational goals of this subject, it will not be possible to reform educational policies and improve the quality of teaching-learning. Therefore, the present study is an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice in history education, focusing on understanding its internal logic, cultural necessities, and educational functions in the Iranian education system. Recommendations The results of this study showed that technological developments and the expansion of new media have led the education system to redefine the cultural and social role of teachers. In the current situation, history education is no longer limited to transmitting past information, but is considered a tool for reconstructing historical awareness, strengthening critical thinking, and promoting the cultural identity of the new generation. By providing extensive communication platforms, new media have provided an unprecedented opportunity to rethink the logic of history education and redefine the role of teachers as cultural actors. From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this study are consistent with the views of Freire (1970) and Habermas (1987), in the sense that effective education can only be achieved when the learning process is based on dialogue, critical thinking, and active participation. New media can be a tool for realizing this logic, because their structure relies on interaction, immediate feedback, and equal access to resources. In such circumstances, the teacher is not simply a transmitter of historical knowledge, but also a facilitator of the process of collective meaning-making in digital contexts. Analysis of the results shows that the more teachers use modern educational technologies and the more purposeful they are, the more likely it is that they will develop historical thinking skills, source analysis, and multiple interpretations among students. TAbstract . In the present study, the “logic and why of history education” is examined from a sociological and educational perspective to clarify why and how history education should serve the reconstruction of students’ national and social identity. The main research question is: Has history education in the Iranian educational system been able to play its role in strengthening national identity and developing historical thinking? In order to answer this question, the present study, with a qualitative approach and field method, examines the views of professors and student teachers of history at Farhangian University of Lorestan in order to gain a deeper understanding of the current situation and strategies for improving history education within the framework of the philosophy of education and the sociology of education through their lived experiences. The present study aims to explore the logic and rationale of history education in Iran’s educational system, emphasizing its role in strengthening national and cultural identity. History teaching is not merely the transmission of past events, but a pedagogical tool for fostering critical thinking, historical awareness, and cultural continuity. In recent years, with the expansion of digital media and changing youth values, the need to reconsider the aims and methods of history education has become increasingly urgent. This research employed a qualitative, field-based approach. The study population included 15 history education professors and 30 student-teachers from Farhangian University of Lorestan, selected through purposive sampling. Semi-structured interviews were used for data collection, and thematic analysis was applied for data interpretation. Findings indicate that history education becomes meaningful when linked to learners’ national identity and cultural background. Shifting from memory-based approaches toward analytical and problem-oriented learning fosters deeper engagement and a stronger sense of belonging. Finally, several practical strategies for improving history education in teacher training programs and school curricula are proposed. From a negative perspective, ignoring the why and philosophy of history education reduces this course to a level of memory-based and non-analytical information transfer, which results in learners’ disinterest, reduced motivation to learn, and a disconnect between the course content and real life. If history is viewed simply as a collection of events, historians, and kings, its educational and identity-building function is lost. This can lead to a kind of crisis of meaning in education, in which the younger generation loses its connection to the past and its cultural identity (Haydn, 2012). On a larger scale, neglecting the logic of history education leads to the weakening of cultural capital, the instability of national identity, and even the formation of superficial attitudes towards history (Husbands, Kitson, & Pendry, 2003). On the other hand, in the teacher education system, the lack of theoretical reflection on the goals and whys of history education can have long-term consequences for the quality of education. If student teachers enter the teaching field without understanding the philosophy of history education, they will view historical content not as a tool for fostering critical thinking and citizenship, but simply as a collection of data. This leads to a weakening of the educational role of history in schools (Barton & Levstik, 2004). Therefore, addressing the necessity and logic of teaching history from a scientific and field perspective is not only an educational need but also a cultural and social necessity that can be effective in designing curricula, compiling educational books, and empowering history teachers. In Iran, studies also show that many history teachers are still involved in descriptive education and have moved less towards conceptual and analytical education (Akbari, 2011; Babaei, 2019). This issue doubles the importance of a field study on why history is taught, because without a deep understanding of the philosophy and educational goals of this subject, it will not be possible to reform educational policies and improve the quality of teaching-learning. Therefore, the present study is an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice in history education, focusing on understanding its internal logic, cultural necessities, and educational functions in the Iranian education system. Recommendations The results of this study showed that technological developments and the expansion of new media have led the education system to redefine the cultural and social role of teachers. In the current situation, history education is no longer limited to transmitting past information, but is considered a tool for reconstructing historical awareness, strengthening critical thinking, and promoting the cultural identity of the new generation. By providing extensive communication platforms, new media have provided an unprecedented opportunity to rethink the logic of history education and redefine the role of teachers as cultural actors. From a theoretical perspective, the findings of this study are consistent with the views of Freire (1970) and Habermas (1987), in the sense that effective education can only be achieved when the learning process is based on dialogue, critical thinking, and active participation. New media can be a tool for realizing this logic, because their structure relies on interaction, immediate feedback, and equal access to resources. In such circumstances, the teacher is not simply a transmitter of historical knowledge, but also a facilitator of the process of collective meaning-making in digital contexts. Analysis of the results shows that the more teachers use modern educational technologies and the more purposeful they are, the more likely it is that they will develop historical thinking skills, source analysis, and multiple interpretations among students.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28872_1a21d8c9bbb99bca627434dbf4b98d01.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Historical analysis of gasoline pricing trends in Iran; effects and consequences Historical analysis of gasoline pricing trends in Iran; effects and consequences 28873 10.48311/jhs.2026.119169.82933 FA Mostafa Shokri Assistant Professor , Department of Economics, Faculty of Management, and Economics, Lorestan University, Khorramabad,, Iran 0009-0004-6092-1925 Priya Sephavndi Master's degree student in Economics, Lorestan University, Khorramabad, Iran. Kobra Farhadi PhD student in Monetary Economics, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2026 02 08 Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest. Gasoline is one of the most important energy carriers, and its pricing is highly sensitive. Because any decision to change the price of gasoline must be weighed against economic and security aspects. Because of this importance, governments in the Iranian economy usually adopt a policy of stabilizing the price of gasoline and, like a mediator, prevent the price of gasoline from increasing. This review study attempts to examine, through a historical review, the events that led to the change in the price of gasoline and its consequences during the years 1951 to 2025. The studies in this study show that the most successful approaches to changing the price of gasoline have been gradual and stepwise annual changes with an increase rate of less than 100 percent. Historical evidence also shows that artificially stabilizing the price of gasoline for consecutive years and then increasing it with rates above 100 percent increases the likelihood of shocks and social unrest.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28873_ccfed80e87ba3e3a64b55176df02a9d5.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 From Youth to Mujahideen: Disciplinary Techniques in the Discourse of Armed Groups Before the Revolution (Case Study of the People's Mojahedin Organization) From Youth to Mujahideen: Disciplinary Techniques in the Discourse of Armed Groups Before the Revolution (Case Study of the People's Mojahedin Organization) 28923 10.48311/jhs.2026.117310.82911 FA Mojtaba Taleghani PhD Graduate in Sociology (Theoretical-Cultural Specialization), University of Tehran 0009-0003-4574-349X Journal Article 2025 10 28 Drawing on Michel Foucault's theoretical framework and employing historical discourse analysis, this article examines the process of producing the "mujahid" subject within the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) during the 1960s and 1970s. The central research question investigates how the PMOI, through a set of disciplinary techniques, transformed young individuals into obedient, self-sacrificing subjects willing to devote their lives to organizational goals. To answer this question, the study analyzes internal organizational documents, ideological publications, training materials, and memoirs of former members, focusing on Foucaultian concepts of the body, visibility, discipline, subjection, and subjectification. The findings reveal that the PMOI systematically reconstructed members' identities through an interconnected network of disciplinary techniques including team houses, continuous surveillance, meticulous regulation of daily life, practices of criticism and self-criticism, boycott (social ostracism), ideological and military training, and self-cultivation programs. These techniques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.iques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.Drawing on Michel Foucault's theoretical framework and employing historical discourse analysis, this article examines the process of producing the "mujahid" subject within the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) during the 1960s and 1970s. The central research question investigates how the PMOI, through a set of disciplinary techniques, transformed young individuals into obedient, self-sacrificing subjects willing to devote their lives to organizational goals. To answer this question, the study analyzes internal organizational documents, ideological publications, training materials, and memoirs of former members, focusing on Foucaultian concepts of the body, visibility, discipline, subjection, and subjectification. The findings reveal that the PMOI systematically reconstructed members' identities through an interconnected network of disciplinary techniques including team houses, continuous surveillance, meticulous regulation of daily life, practices of criticism and self-criticism, boycott (social ostracism), ideological and military training, and self-cultivation programs. These techniques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.iques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. Drawing on Michel Foucault's theoretical framework and employing historical discourse analysis, this article examines the process of producing the "mujahid" subject within the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) during the 1960s and 1970s. The central research question investigates how the PMOI, through a set of disciplinary techniques, transformed young individuals into obedient, self-sacrificing subjects willing to devote their lives to organizational goals. To answer this question, the study analyzes internal organizational documents, ideological publications, training materials, and memoirs of former members, focusing on Foucaultian concepts of the body, visibility, discipline, subjection, and subjectification. The findings reveal that the PMOI systematically reconstructed members' identities through an interconnected network of disciplinary techniques including team houses, continuous surveillance, meticulous regulation of daily life, practices of criticism and self-criticism, boycott (social ostracism), ideological and military training, and self-cultivation programs. These techniques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.iques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.Drawing on Michel Foucault's theoretical framework and employing historical discourse analysis, this article examines the process of producing the "mujahid" subject within the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) during the 1960s and 1970s. The central research question investigates how the PMOI, through a set of disciplinary techniques, transformed young individuals into obedient, self-sacrificing subjects willing to devote their lives to organizational goals. To answer this question, the study analyzes internal organizational documents, ideological publications, training materials, and memoirs of former members, focusing on Foucaultian concepts of the body, visibility, discipline, subjection, and subjectification. The findings reveal that the PMOI systematically reconstructed members' identities through an interconnected network of disciplinary techniques including team houses, continuous surveillance, meticulous regulation of daily life, practices of criticism and self-criticism, boycott (social ostracism), ideological and military training, and self-cultivation programs. These techniques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject. The results demonstrate that the formation of the mujahid subject cannot be understood merely as the product of adopting a political ideology. Rather, it must be recognized as the outcome of a complex interplay of micro-physical mechanisms of power operating within the organizational structure. From this perspective, the PMOI was not simply a political organization but a site for the exercise of disciplinary techniques and the production of revolutionary subjects, in which members' individuality was transformed in the service of reconstructing organizational identity. Events such as the June 1963 uprising and the Siahkal incident served as epistemic turning points that transformed armed struggle from an abstract theoretical possibility into a sacred historical necessity. The article concludes by suggesting that future research should explore the role of gender, familial relations, and comparative cases in other regional contexts.iques operated by rendering individuals constantly visible and exercising control over their bodies, minds, and emotions, thereby facilitating the internalization of organizational norms. Within this discourse, the body was understood as an object to be intervened upon and politically trained, while discipline functioned as the primary technology for producing the mujahid subject.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28923_ad0e9e545bd1d949dcf019ce06a2ae95.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 The expansion of world-system and long-run decline of dynastic states in Iran with consideration to Nader Shah Rule The expansion of world-system and long-run decline of dynastic states in Iran with consideration to Nader Shah Rule 28970 10.48311/jhs.2026.104690.0 FA Seyed Rahim Teimouri PhD graduate in Sociology of Development, University of Tehran 0000-0001-6228-262X Journal Article 2025 09 20 The nearly two-decade period encompassing Nader Shah’s conquests (1727–1736) and reign (1736–1747) represents a vivid narrative of the rise and fall of one of the last large-scale nomadic campaigns originating from Central Asia and the Iranian plateau. During this time, Nader ruled over the Iranian heartland and newly annexed territories, stretching from India and Turkestan to the southern Persian Gulf and parts of the Caucasus . His campaigns echo the classic examples of earlier nomadic movements, such as those of the Ghaznavids and Seljuks in the 10th and 11th centuries, the Mongols and Ilkhanids in the 13th century, and Timur in the 14th century. What forces drove the establishment, disintegration, and ultimate collapse of these final nomadic governmental systems in Central Asia and Iran? Was the downfall of Nader’s regime an inevitable outcome? This article first illustrate, respectively, the fall of the Safavid dynasty, the Afghan occupation, and the rise of Nader Qoli Khan Afshar (1722–1736), as well as Nader Shah Afshar’s major military campaigns (1736–1747). His conquests, originating from the Abiward region, bear a striking resemblance to Timur’s earlier campaigns. Born in 1698 into a low-income Turkmen nomadic family in northern Khorasan, Nader belonged to the Qerekhlu clan of the Afshar tribe, a core member of the Qizilbash confederation. His rise to prominence began during the Safavid interregnum in 1722, when he initially served as a military commander for Shah Tahmasp II in Khorasan, earning the title Tahmasp Qoli in 1725. By 1729, after a series of decisive victories, he had expelled the Ghilzai Afghans from Isfahan. Acting as a liberator, Nader restored the nominal Safavid monarchy from 1727 to 1736 before ultimately seizing the throne himself, ruling as king from 1736 until 1747. A striking feature of Maps 1 and 2, and a key to Nader Shah’s remarkable success, was his early ability to unify disparate tribal groups into a cohesive and effective military force. These groups included Khorasan Kurds, various Qajar tribes and their Turkmen allies, Baluchis, southeastern tribes, Abdali and Ghilzai Afghans, and even Uzbeks. What set Nader’s organization apart from earlier Turkic-Mongol structures was the multi-ethnic composition of his army, which allowed him to integrate rural populations from distant villages into his forces. This innovative approach to military organization played a crucial role in his initial successes but also highlighted the challenges of maintaining such a diverse and far-flung empire .Nader Shah’s campaigns occurred during the Safavid interregnum, a period when Iran’s political structure, though fragile in competition with the Ottomans and the Mughal Empire, had at least united the people of central Iran under a single political framework. The sacred Safavid monarchy, along with the belief that its kings were descendants of the Prophet, was a legacy that could not be easily replaced. Shiism was so deeply ingrained in the urban population’s consciousness that any attempt by Nader to introduce an alternative sparked major uprisings. As a result, by the late 18th century, no stable model of governance had emerged in Iran. The Qajar rulers managed to establish only a shaky foundation of legitimacy in the 19th century, which later collapsed under the weight of Pahlavi-era nationalism. The institutional structure of the Safavid state was composed of three layers: military, bureaucratic, and religious. Under Nader, however, only the military layer retained significance, while the other layers diminished in importance. Military despotism became a major obstacle to effective governance and administrative understanding. Nader’s continuous struggle against the Safavid bureaucracy and his replacement of administrative elites with military nobles quickly proved destructive. The bureaucratic foundation of the Safavid dynasty never recovered. The direct consequence of Nader Shah’s relentless campaigns was the transformation of the Safavid Empire’s strategic commercial landscape into scorched earth, reducing the country’s trade capabilities to a critical point. In its final years, the Safavid dynasty was on the brink of collapse, facing incursions by powerful neighbors and emerging foreign rivals. Even in the absence of Nader’s conquests and rule, the prospect of restoring its former position would have been highly challenging. In this context, the depletion of territorial, class, and human resources during Nader’s era left the country ill-equipped for economic resurgence in the 19th century and beyond. Although Iran’s peripheralization and colonization were less severe compared to other dynastic states in Asia, the damage inflicted during Nader’s reign defined the unique characteristics of its long-term decline and posed enduring challenges for the country’s future restoration. The nearly two-decade period encompassing Nader Shah’s conquests (1727–1736) and reign (1736–1747) represents a vivid narrative of the rise and fall of one of the last large-scale nomadic campaigns originating from Central Asia and the Iranian plateau. During this time, Nader ruled over the Iranian heartland and newly annexed territories, stretching from India and Turkestan to the southern Persian Gulf and parts of the Caucasus . His campaigns echo the classic examples of earlier nomadic movements, such as those of the Ghaznavids and Seljuks in the 10th and 11th centuries, the Mongols and Ilkhanids in the 13th century, and Timur in the 14th century. What forces drove the establishment, disintegration, and ultimate collapse of these final nomadic governmental systems in Central Asia and Iran? Was the downfall of Nader’s regime an inevitable outcome? This article first illustrate, respectively, the fall of the Safavid dynasty, the Afghan occupation, and the rise of Nader Qoli Khan Afshar (1722–1736), as well as Nader Shah Afshar’s major military campaigns (1736–1747). His conquests, originating from the Abiward region, bear a striking resemblance to Timur’s earlier campaigns. Born in 1698 into a low-income Turkmen nomadic family in northern Khorasan, Nader belonged to the Qerekhlu clan of the Afshar tribe, a core member of the Qizilbash confederation. His rise to prominence began during the Safavid interregnum in 1722, when he initially served as a military commander for Shah Tahmasp II in Khorasan, earning the title Tahmasp Qoli in 1725. By 1729, after a series of decisive victories, he had expelled the Ghilzai Afghans from Isfahan. Acting as a liberator, Nader restored the nominal Safavid monarchy from 1727 to 1736 before ultimately seizing the throne himself, ruling as king from 1736 until 1747. A striking feature of Maps 1 and 2, and a key to Nader Shah’s remarkable success, was his early ability to unify disparate tribal groups into a cohesive and effective military force. These groups included Khorasan Kurds, various Qajar tribes and their Turkmen allies, Baluchis, southeastern tribes, Abdali and Ghilzai Afghans, and even Uzbeks. What set Nader’s organization apart from earlier Turkic-Mongol structures was the multi-ethnic composition of his army, which allowed him to integrate rural populations from distant villages into his forces. This innovative approach to military organization played a crucial role in his initial successes but also highlighted the challenges of maintaining such a diverse and far-flung empire .Nader Shah’s campaigns occurred during the Safavid interregnum, a period when Iran’s political structure, though fragile in competition with the Ottomans and the Mughal Empire, had at least united the people of central Iran under a single political framework. The sacred Safavid monarchy, along with the belief that its kings were descendants of the Prophet, was a legacy that could not be easily replaced. Shiism was so deeply ingrained in the urban population’s consciousness that any attempt by Nader to introduce an alternative sparked major uprisings. As a result, by the late 18th century, no stable model of governance had emerged in Iran. The Qajar rulers managed to establish only a shaky foundation of legitimacy in the 19th century, which later collapsed under the weight of Pahlavi-era nationalism. The institutional structure of the Safavid state was composed of three layers: military, bureaucratic, and religious. Under Nader, however, only the military layer retained significance, while the other layers diminished in importance. Military despotism became a major obstacle to effective governance and administrative understanding. Nader’s continuous struggle against the Safavid bureaucracy and his replacement of administrative elites with military nobles quickly proved destructive. The bureaucratic foundation of the Safavid dynasty never recovered. The direct consequence of Nader Shah’s relentless campaigns was the transformation of the Safavid Empire’s strategic commercial landscape into scorched earth, reducing the country’s trade capabilities to a critical point. In its final years, the Safavid dynasty was on the brink of collapse, facing incursions by powerful neighbors and emerging foreign rivals. Even in the absence of Nader’s conquests and rule, the prospect of restoring its former position would have been highly challenging. In this context, the depletion of territorial, class, and human resources during Nader’s era left the country ill-equipped for economic resurgence in the 19th century and beyond. Although Iran’s peripheralization and colonization were less severe compared to other dynastic states in Asia, the damage inflicted during Nader’s reign defined the unique characteristics of its long-term decline and posed enduring challenges for the country’s future restoration.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28970_3f2b8decc6771a77dad1fa90ced28eaa.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 Reflection of Daily Life and Social Customs in the Urban Structure of Shiraz during the Zand Period Reflection of Daily Life and Social Customs in the Urban Structure of Shiraz during the Zand Period 28971 10.48311/jhs.2026.120632.82954 FA Javad Habibi Ph.D. student of history, department of humanities, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Mohammad Ali Ranjbar Associate Professor. Shiraz University. Shiraz. Iran. 0000-0001-6383-9944 Javad Mousavi Dalini Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran 0000-0002-4029-1610 Journal Article 2026 06 03 This study explores how everyday life and social customs were reflected in the urban society of Shiraz during the Zand period. The central question is how, after the collapse of the Safavid state and a prolonged era of political, military, and social instability, the establishment of the Zand government—especially under Karim Khan Zand—created conditions for the revival of urban social and cultural life. The fall of the Safavids had brought deep insecurity and economic hardship, sidelining many rituals and cultural expressions. Yet, once Karim Khan stabilized his rule and restored relative security, the ground was prepared for rebuilding social relations, reviving collective traditions, and reconstructing the cultural vitality of cities. The research therefore aims to show how daily life in Shiraz was organized in this period and how it aligned with the social and cultural policies of the Zand administration. Using a historical method and a descriptive–analytical approach, the study draws on historical texts, European travelogues, and modern scholarship. Due to the limited information in Persian sources regarding everyday life, accounts by travelers such as Niebuhr, Scott Waring, Drouville, and Franklin serve as essential sources for reconstructing the social atmosphere of the time. Within the theoretical framework, everyday life is treated as a lens for understanding cultural and social change, while social customs are examined as indicators of urban structures and norms. Patterns of daily living in Zand-era Shiraz reveal that clothing was an important marker of social identity and cultural context. Men wore shirts, loose trousers, and outfits adapted to local climate, while clear class distinctions were evident in the quality and style of fabrics. Women’s clothing differed between private and public spheres: at home, garments were simpler, while in public spaces chadors, veils, and modest coverings were standard. Personal adornment, jewelry, and beauty practices—such as the use of kohl and an emphasis on large, expressive eyes—were significant aspects of women’s cultural expression. Hospitality and social gatherings formed another essential part of daily life in this era. In Shiraz, social visits were not limited to sharing a meal but included artistic and cultural activities. Hosts often began by offering hookah and beverages such as tea or coffee, followed by fruits, sweets, and a variety of dishes. The presence of musicians, singers, and storytellers in these gatherings demonstrates that music, performance, and narration were inseparable from urban leisure culture. The hookah, in particular, symbolized sociability and hospitality and held a central place in interactions. Family institutions and marriage rituals also reflected traditional social structures. Marriage was considered a bond between families rather than individuals, with parents playing a decisive role in choosing a spouse. In some cases, engagements were arranged at young ages. Wedding ceremonies included stages such as proposal, dowry negotiation, henna-night festivities, and multi-day celebrations accompanied by music, dance, and the participation of extended family. These events reinforced both family bonds and broader social cohesion. Public bathhouses played a significant role in the social life of Shiraz. Beyond their hygienic function, they were centers for conversation, social interaction, and occasionally small celebrations such as the Golrizan ritual. Their architectural design addressed hygienic, religious, and social needs simultaneously. The separation of bathing times for men and women reflects the moral and social norms that shaped public life. Ritual sports and the culture of chivalry, practiced in the zurkhaneh, represented another dimension of everyday life. Zurkhanehs functioned not only as places for physical exercise—such as wrestling and club-swinging—but also as community spaces where traditional values were taught and enacted. Music, invocations, respect for champions, and the presence of spectators transformed athletic practice into a collective ritual. These institutions demonstrated the strong connection between physical training, moral values, and religious beliefs in the urban culture of the period. The cultural atmosphere of Shiraz was further enriched by theatrical entertainment and music. Clowns, imitators, and musicians performed at both public gatherings and courtly events, providing humor, imitation acts, and musical performances. The diversity of musical instruments and the skill of performers indicate that the arts were flourishing, and some women also contributed to musical performances. At a broader level, the political stability achieved during the reign of Karim Khan Zand was crucial to these social developments. After years of turmoil, the restoration of security allowed people to return to normal patterns of life and reinvest in celebrations, gatherings, and cultural activities. The renewed interest in joy and entertainment can be interpreted as a natural reaction to previous hardships. Karim Khan’s relatively tolerant and socially supportive policies encouraged this cultural revival and helped create a lively and open urban environment. In sum, the study concludes that Shiraz became one of the main centers for the revival of social and cultural life during the Zand period. Political stability, supportive governmental policies, and the flourishing of urban spaces allowed rituals, festivals, and everyday practices to regain their place in society. From clothing and hospitality to marriage, sports, and entertainment, daily life reflected a new social atmosphere that emerged after prolonged crisis. The Zand era thus represents a significant stage in the reconstruction of cultural and social life in eighteenth-century Iran—a period during which Shiraz successfully restored its communal rituals and social relations, achieving a renewed sense of balance and dynamism. This study explores how everyday life and social customs were reflected in the urban society of Shiraz during the Zand period. The central question is how, after the collapse of the Safavid state and a prolonged era of political, military, and social instability, the establishment of the Zand government—especially under Karim Khan Zand—created conditions for the revival of urban social and cultural life. The fall of the Safavids had brought deep insecurity and economic hardship, sidelining many rituals and cultural expressions. Yet, once Karim Khan stabilized his rule and restored relative security, the ground was prepared for rebuilding social relations, reviving collective traditions, and reconstructing the cultural vitality of cities. The research therefore aims to show how daily life in Shiraz was organized in this period and how it aligned with the social and cultural policies of the Zand administration. Using a historical method and a descriptive–analytical approach, the study draws on historical texts, European travelogues, and modern scholarship. Due to the limited information in Persian sources regarding everyday life, accounts by travelers such as Niebuhr, Scott Waring, Drouville, and Franklin serve as essential sources for reconstructing the social atmosphere of the time. Within the theoretical framework, everyday life is treated as a lens for understanding cultural and social change, while social customs are examined as indicators of urban structures and norms. Patterns of daily living in Zand-era Shiraz reveal that clothing was an important marker of social identity and cultural context. Men wore shirts, loose trousers, and outfits adapted to local climate, while clear class distinctions were evident in the quality and style of fabrics. Women’s clothing differed between private and public spheres: at home, garments were simpler, while in public spaces chadors, veils, and modest coverings were standard. Personal adornment, jewelry, and beauty practices—such as the use of kohl and an emphasis on large, expressive eyes—were significant aspects of women’s cultural expression. Hospitality and social gatherings formed another essential part of daily life in this era. In Shiraz, social visits were not limited to sharing a meal but included artistic and cultural activities. Hosts often began by offering hookah and beverages such as tea or coffee, followed by fruits, sweets, and a variety of dishes. The presence of musicians, singers, and storytellers in these gatherings demonstrates that music, performance, and narration were inseparable from urban leisure culture. The hookah, in particular, symbolized sociability and hospitality and held a central place in interactions. Family institutions and marriage rituals also reflected traditional social structures. Marriage was considered a bond between families rather than individuals, with parents playing a decisive role in choosing a spouse. In some cases, engagements were arranged at young ages. Wedding ceremonies included stages such as proposal, dowry negotiation, henna-night festivities, and multi-day celebrations accompanied by music, dance, and the participation of extended family. These events reinforced both family bonds and broader social cohesion. Public bathhouses played a significant role in the social life of Shiraz. Beyond their hygienic function, they were centers for conversation, social interaction, and occasionally small celebrations such as the Golrizan ritual. Their architectural design addressed hygienic, religious, and social needs simultaneously. The separation of bathing times for men and women reflects the moral and social norms that shaped public life. Ritual sports and the culture of chivalry, practiced in the zurkhaneh, represented another dimension of everyday life. Zurkhanehs functioned not only as places for physical exercise—such as wrestling and club-swinging—but also as community spaces where traditional values were taught and enacted. Music, invocations, respect for champions, and the presence of spectators transformed athletic practice into a collective ritual. These institutions demonstrated the strong connection between physical training, moral values, and religious beliefs in the urban culture of the period. The cultural atmosphere of Shiraz was further enriched by theatrical entertainment and music. Clowns, imitators, and musicians performed at both public gatherings and courtly events, providing humor, imitation acts, and musical performances. The diversity of musical instruments and the skill of performers indicate that the arts were flourishing, and some women also contributed to musical performances. At a broader level, the political stability achieved during the reign of Karim Khan Zand was crucial to these social developments. After years of turmoil, the restoration of security allowed people to return to normal patterns of life and reinvest in celebrations, gatherings, and cultural activities. The renewed interest in joy and entertainment can be interpreted as a natural reaction to previous hardships. Karim Khan’s relatively tolerant and socially supportive policies encouraged this cultural revival and helped create a lively and open urban environment. In sum, the study concludes that Shiraz became one of the main centers for the revival of social and cultural life during the Zand period. Political stability, supportive governmental policies, and the flourishing of urban spaces allowed rituals, festivals, and everyday practices to regain their place in society. From clothing and hospitality to marriage, sports, and entertainment, daily life reflected a new social atmosphere that emerged after prolonged crisis. The Zand era thus represents a significant stage in the reconstruction of cultural and social life in eighteenth-century Iran—a period during which Shiraz successfully restored its communal rituals and social relations, achieving a renewed sense of balance and dynamism.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28971_1aa4d17f2dcdae2f4ced909341741792.pdf

Tarbiat Modares University historical sociology 2322-1941 17 1 2026 03 21 A Socio-Historical Re-reading of Alireza Molaei Tavani’s View on the Invalidity of Treating the 1921 Coup as the Origin of Contemporary Iranian History A Socio-Historical Re-reading of Alireza Molaei Tavani’s View on the Invalidity of Treating the 1921 Coup as the Origin of Contemporary Iranian History 28991 10.48311/jhs.2026.120519.82951 FA رضا معینی رودبالی Assistant Professor, Department of history Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran. . Seyed Sohrab Hosseini A. in the History of Islamic Iran (Iranian Studies), Meybod University, Yazd, Iran Journal Article 2026 05 16 Determining the origin of contemporary Iranian history is a contentious issue in contemporary historiography, as every proposed starting point presupposes a specific understanding of modernity, the state, society, and political power. The central problem of this article is whether the 1921 coup and the rise of the Reza Shah state can be considered the beginning of contemporary Iranian history, or if they should be analyzed as a continsuation of previous trends, particularly the Constitutional Revolution. The objective of this study is to re-read Alireza Molaei Tavani’s perspective on the invalidity of establishing 1921 as the historical origin and to expand upon it within the framework of historical sociology concepts. The primary research question is: based on concepts such as state crisis, institutional capacity, state-building, and political legitimacy, which event holds a more fundamental position in periodizing contemporary Iranian history? The research method is historical-interpretive analysis with a historical sociology approach, utilizing data from historiographical works, theoretical studies, sources related to the Qajar and Pahlavi eras, memoirs of political figures, and samples of Pahlavi-era press. The findings demonstrate that while the late Qajar crisis was a historical reality, the official Pahlavi historiography, through discursive representation of this crisis, established the 1921 coup as the origin of “modern Iran.” Conversely, the Constitutional Revolution transformed the logic of politics in Iran by introducing concepts such as law, parliament, the nation, representation, and the limitation of power. The article concludes that although the Reza Shah state was a significant stage in centralizing authority and increasing the state’s institutional capacity, it is not the origin of contemporary Iranian history, as Iranian modernity had already begun earlier with the Constitutional Revolution’s questioning of legitimacy and the limits of power.The analysis presented in this article has shown that the Reza Shah-centered narrative of contemporary Iranian history, focusing on the issue of order, authority, and efficiency of the state, has highlighted the 1969 coup as the starting point of the “new Iran.” However, such a narrative reduces part of the more complex process of state transformation in Iran to a single moment of rupture. An examination of Iran’s political and institutional developments shows that many of the trends that gained greater focus and coherence during Reza Shah’s reign had their roots in the political and institutional crises of the post-constitutional period and cannot be understood without considering that historical context. In this framework, the present article follows Mollaei’s view that the Constitutional Revolution has a more fundamental place in determining the origins of contemporary Iranian history. The importance of the Constitutional Revolution lay not only in changing the form of government, but also in opening up a new horizon of political concepts, after which the understanding of power and the state in Iran was formulated in relation to them. Concepts such as law, representation, nation, and state responsibility created a new language for politics and created a conceptual framework within which even subsequent authoritarian developments took shape.From the perspective of historical sociology, the importance of this result is that it shows that historical origins are not simply extracted from a political event, but are formed in the interaction between institutional crises, historiographical narratives, and discursive representations. In this sense, determining the origin of contemporary Iranian history is not only related to the assessment of political developments, but also to the way in which Iranian history has been narrated in scholarly and public memory.In recent years, researchers have examined the context and consequences of the 1969 coup from various angles. Karimi Kondroud and Khajeh Nouri.Focusing on the role of Britain,also Sadeghifard has foucosing and analyzed this event within the framework of England's regional policies after World War I. Finally, a reflection on this issue shows that contemporary Iranian history must be understood in the form of a continuous but crisis-ridden process; a process in which the Constitutional Revolution opened the conceptual horizon of new politics, the crises that followed highlighted the issue of the state and political order, and the developments of the following decades attempted to respond to this crisis in different ways.the importance of discussing the origin of contemporary history lies not in determining a calendar date, but in clarifying the logic of political transformation in Iran. Determining the origin of contemporary Iranian history is a contentious issue in contemporary historiography, as every proposed starting point presupposes a specific understanding of modernity, the state, society, and political power. The central problem of this article is whether the 1921 coup and the rise of the Reza Shah state can be considered the beginning of contemporary Iranian history, or if they should be analyzed as a continsuation of previous trends, particularly the Constitutional Revolution. The objective of this study is to re-read Alireza Molaei Tavani’s perspective on the invalidity of establishing 1921 as the historical origin and to expand upon it within the framework of historical sociology concepts. The primary research question is: based on concepts such as state crisis, institutional capacity, state-building, and political legitimacy, which event holds a more fundamental position in periodizing contemporary Iranian history? The research method is historical-interpretive analysis with a historical sociology approach, utilizing data from historiographical works, theoretical studies, sources related to the Qajar and Pahlavi eras, memoirs of political figures, and samples of Pahlavi-era press. The findings demonstrate that while the late Qajar crisis was a historical reality, the official Pahlavi historiography, through discursive representation of this crisis, established the 1921 coup as the origin of “modern Iran.” Conversely, the Constitutional Revolution transformed the logic of politics in Iran by introducing concepts such as law, parliament, the nation, representation, and the limitation of power. The article concludes that although the Reza Shah state was a significant stage in centralizing authority and increasing the state’s institutional capacity, it is not the origin of contemporary Iranian history, as Iranian modernity had already begun earlier with the Constitutional Revolution’s questioning of legitimacy and the limits of power.The analysis presented in this article has shown that the Reza Shah-centered narrative of contemporary Iranian history, focusing on the issue of order, authority, and efficiency of the state, has highlighted the 1969 coup as the starting point of the “new Iran.” However, such a narrative reduces part of the more complex process of state transformation in Iran to a single moment of rupture. An examination of Iran’s political and institutional developments shows that many of the trends that gained greater focus and coherence during Reza Shah’s reign had their roots in the political and institutional crises of the post-constitutional period and cannot be understood without considering that historical context. In this framework, the present article follows Mollaei’s view that the Constitutional Revolution has a more fundamental place in determining the origins of contemporary Iranian history. The importance of the Constitutional Revolution lay not only in changing the form of government, but also in opening up a new horizon of political concepts, after which the understanding of power and the state in Iran was formulated in relation to them. Concepts such as law, representation, nation, and state responsibility created a new language for politics and created a conceptual framework within which even subsequent authoritarian developments took shape.From the perspective of historical sociology, the importance of this result is that it shows that historical origins are not simply extracted from a political event, but are formed in the interaction between institutional crises, historiographical narratives, and discursive representations. In this sense, determining the origin of contemporary Iranian history is not only related to the assessment of political developments, but also to the way in which Iranian history has been narrated in scholarly and public memory.In recent years, researchers have examined the context and consequences of the 1969 coup from various angles. Karimi Kondroud and Khajeh Nouri.Focusing on the role of Britain,also Sadeghifard has foucosing and analyzed this event within the framework of England's regional policies after World War I. Finally, a reflection on this issue shows that contemporary Iranian history must be understood in the form of a continuous but crisis-ridden process; a process in which the Constitutional Revolution opened the conceptual horizon of new politics, the crises that followed highlighted the issue of the state and political order, and the developments of the following decades attempted to respond to this crisis in different ways.the importance of discussing the origin of contemporary history lies not in determining a calendar date, but in clarifying the logic of political transformation in Iran.

https://jhs.modares.ac.ir/article_28991_0ec3d867002e7da0e75c898a89bc4097.pdf